

# Fulbright Asserts Rogers Frequently Withheld Data

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 4 — Senator J. W. Fulbright of Arkansas charged today that Secretary of State William P. Rogers had "all too often withheld information" on the war in Indochina from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The Secretary, who only yesterday was defending himself against Senate charges that he had been eclipsed in power by Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national security, seemed taken aback by the latest attack by a personal friend on the Foreign Relations Committee.

Leaving a House Appropriations subcommittee hearing, Mr. Rogers declined comment on the Fulbright charge but immediately ordered an aide to get a copy of the senator's speech.

As examples of how Mr. Rogers had "withheld" information, Senator Fulbright said that "neither the Cambodian nor the Laotian intervention were made known to the Foreign Relations Committee in advance, although on both occasions Secretary Rogers had met with the committee shortly before the military operations began, ostensibly to discuss those very subjects."

## Secret War Charged

In a speech he is to deliver in the Senate tomorrow, Senator Fulbright will cite as another example the failure of the executive branch to make "known to Congress and the American people that the United States has been conducting a secret war in northern Laos." The Senator did not specifically blame Mr. Rogers for withholding this information from the Foreign Relations Committee.

Responding to the Fulbright complaints, Robert J. McCloskey, a State Department spokesman, said that Mr. Rogers had "never failed to answer questions" by members of the Foreign Relations Committee and that "every answer given was given truthfully and fully." The only information withheld, he said, "had to do with impending military operations."

Following the release of the Fulbright speech, Senate sources disclosed, Mr. Rogers also called Senator Fulbright, and the Senator reportedly explained that the main target of his speech was not Mr. Rogers but the growing influence of Mr. Kissinger and his refusal to appear before Congressional committees.

Senator Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, also joined in the growing complaint within the committee that Mr. Rogers's powers as Secretary of State had been largely pre-empted by Mr. Kissinger.

## Criticism by Symington

Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri, another member of the committee, contended on Tuesday that Mr. Kissinger had become "Secretary of State in everything but title" and that as a result Mr. Rogers had become a laughing-stock on the Washington social circuit. The Symington statement drew an emphatic denial from the White House, which said that President Nixon regarded Mr. Rogers as his "chief adviser on foreign policy."

Despite this White House denial, Senator Fulbright renewed the charge today with the statement:

"Power and influence in the making of foreign policy have passed largely out of the hands of the State Department— which is accountable to Congress—into the hands of Mr. Kissinger's National Security Council staff, which is not,

under the present practice, accountable to Congress.

Senator Fulbright is scheduled to introduce tomorrow legislation that would require officials of the executive branch, when summoned, to appear before Congressional committees even though they may subsequently refuse to testify about certain information on the ground of executive privilege. The legislation is aimed in particular at Mr. Kissinger, whom Senator Fulbright described as "the principal architect of our war policy in Indochina."

Unlike Mr. Rogers, who Senator Fulbright observed at least withheld information while appearing in person before the committee, Mr. Kissinger has refused repeated requests to testify, even informally and privately, before the Foreign Relations Committee, citing executive privilege as a member of the President's staff.

Senator Fulbright said the purpose of the bill was to eliminate the "unwarranted extension" of the concept of executive privilege and to make a "small breach in the wall of secrecy behind which the Administration has barricaded itself in matters relating to foreign policy in general, to our war aims in Indochina in particular."

Senator Fulbright noted that at a recent closed-door committee hearing, Mr. Rogers, whom he identified only as "a high Administration official," had refused to answer the "seminal question" of whether the Administration intended to withdraw all forces from Indochina regardless of political consequences or would withdraw them only if anti-Communist governments were firmly established in the area.

The Administration's refusal to answer this question, he said, "means that the American people are being committed to an open-ended, undeclared unconstitutional war for unknown, classified objectives."

"We are entitled to more than an answer," he said. "As citizens of a Constitutional democracy, we are entitled, through the electoral process and through the legislative process in Congress, to ratify or reject a President's proposed course of action. He is not, in the law, at liberty to make war as he alone sees fit."

It becomes impossible, however, he said, for Congress to exercise its legislative role or its Constitutional responsibilities to declare war if the executive branch is at liberty to have direct access to foreign policy-makers on grounds of executive privilege.

THE WASHINGTON POST

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# Hill Report Cites Greek Repression

By Bernard D. Nossiter  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Despite contrary claims by the State Department, the colonels' regime in Greece is not moving toward democracy and continues on a course of "intimidation" through political arrests and brutality, a Senate staff report concludes.

The report, prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and made public today, also includes these principal findings:

- The American embassy in Athens serves as an apologist for the junta. A widespread Greek belief that Washington supports the regime is its "greatest asset."

- The United States, however, has achieved its declared policy objectives in the military sphere thanks to its "large" program of weapons aid.

The document was prepared by James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, committee aides who spent a week in Athens interviewing former and present officials. The two said they had been shadowed by plainclothes police for much of the last three days of their stay.

See GREEK, A8, Col. 2

## GREEK, From A1

Their 16-page study concludes:

"The policy of friendly persuasion (to move the junta towards a constitutional state) has clearly failed. The regime has accepted the friendship, and the military assistance, but has ignored the persuasion. Indeed, the regime seems to have been able to exert more leverage on us with regard to military assistance than we have been able to exert on the regime with regard to political reform. We see no evidence that this will not continue to be the case."

### No Elections Seen

Prime Minister George Papadopoulos, the paper notes, has failed to implement the new constitution "in most important respects." Martial law persists "as a tool of intimidation." The military continues to make political arrests and government leaders have said there will be no elections "in the foreseeable future."

Official American statements that Athens is moving toward a constitutional order "seem incomprehensible to many Greeks" and there are reports of growing anti-Americanism.

Western observers, the paper says, believe torture has lessened and perhaps disappeared. But civilians are picked up without warrants, held incommunicado for more than 20 days, are probably being "mishandled and even brutally treated" and there are cases of bastinado. This is a form of interrogation in which arrested persons are beaten on the soles of bare feet with bamboo sticks until they talk or "confess."

The regime is supported, the report continues, by the business community, domestic and foreign (American firms account for 40 per cent of the foreign investment since 1953, the biggest single share); and by much of the army and the church hierarchy, whose salaries have been increased. It is said to be opposed by intellectuals, students, civil servants and professionals.

On the key question of the peasants, the document is unable to conclude whether they support the colonels, oppose them or are apathetic.

The study notes what it calls a paradox: the Voice of America broadcasts about democracy to Eastern Europe from transmitters in Greece "where the radio is completely controlled by a regime which has no elected parliament and denies many fundamental civil liberties."

### Role as Apologist

Throughout the paper, Ambassador Henry Tasca's mission is pictured as an apologist for the regime, more concerned with its "image than with the substance . . . quick to praise . . . slow to criticize." The embassy is reported to talk of political prisoners released but fails to count those newly arrested, speaks in "almost lyrical terms" of the Greek economy and "tends read more into the regime's statements than the regime in-

tends or than is warranted on the basis of performance."

The State Department's Public Affairs Office is also taken to task for a "reference" paper it published in January. According to the Foreign Relations staff report, the State Department document understates the number of political prisoners, misleadingly suggests that the constitution is in force and inaccurately implies that no torture has taken place.

Nevertheless, the staff aides do not recommend a re-imposition of the embargo that denied the regime some heavy military weapons until it was lifted last September. The report notes that even during the three-year embargo, military shipments from Washington to Athens averaged \$106.9 million annually against only \$95.2 million in the three preceding years of democratic rule.

The report notes that NATO and American military men regard Greece as occupying a strategic flank and concludes that "Greek cooperation on military matters (in the Middle East) has been satisfactory" to the limited extent that it has been tested.

The State Department, in a brief comment on the report, noted recent official statements of U.S. disappointment in the pace of democratization in Greece.

## REPORT ON GREECE ACCUSES U.S. AIDES

### Senate Investigators Charge State Department Misled Itself and Congress

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 4 —

A report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee contended today that the State Department had misled itself—and in the process Congress—about the willingness of the military junta in Athens to restore constitutional democracy in Greece.

The report argued that the State Department and the United States Embassy in Greece had given too much credence to statements by the junta that parliamentary government would be restored and had then given away their political leverage when the embargo on American arms shipments was lifted last year.

Instead of pushing the regime toward constitutional government, the report found, the United States has now got itself into the position of seeming to support the junta, with the State Department and the embassy issuing misleading

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statements about the progress being made toward restoration of democratic government.

The report, made public today by the committee, was submitted by two staff members—James G. Lowenstein and Richard Moose, two former Foreign Service officers—who earlier this year were ordered to make a fact-finding trip to Greece to review the political situation and the Nixon Administration's decision to resume arms shipments.

#### Two Report Being Trailed

During the last three days of their week-long stay in Greece, the two reported, they were trailed by plainclothes policemen in cars and on foot and were followed to the airport as they left. Apparently the police surveillance was imposed after the Greek Government found that the two, in addition to talking with Government and embassy officials, were also consulting with opposition leaders.

The generally critical report may set the stage for hearings on Administration policy toward Greece by the committee, which is also considering summoning Henry Tasca, the United States Ambassador in Athens, for testimony.

In general, the report was more critical of the embassy than it was of the State Department, and there were suggestions in the report that a split has developed between the embassy and Greek-affairs officers in the State Department over the desirability of lifting the arms embargo and the willingness of the junta to move toward constitutional government.

The "general attitude" of the embassy, the report said, "is defensive about the regime—quick to praise during the period before the embargo was lifted but slow to criticize now that the embargo has ended and the regime is in default on its assurances.

"The embassy," it said, "appears to have operated on the assumption that the regime was sincere in its declared intention to return to parliamentary government" by the end of 1970.

#### Silent on Arrests

Now that the junta is in default on such assurances, the report said, the embassy "not only rationalizes the lack of progress but often appears to be more concerned with the regime's 'image' than with the substance of its actions."

The report noted that the embassy, in support of the regime, "refers to the release of detainees" but make no mention of the fact that political arrests are still continuing. The two investigators said that they had heard of the arrest of 40 to 180 persons since last November, when "the new wave of arrests apparently began."

As an example of an apparent pro-junta attitude, the report pointed to a "fact sheet" issued by the State Department, presumably on the basis of reports from the embassy, that contains "the remarkable sentence" that "with minor exceptions, all institutional laws necessary to put into force the Constitution were promulgated by the end of 1970 as pledged by the Greek Government."

In point of fact, the report said, "the Constitution is by no means yet in effect; elections have not been scheduled or even promised and martial law is still in effect superseding the guarantees of due process for which the Constitution provides."

#### 'Cool but Correct' Reception

Special to The New York Times

ATHENS, March 4 — The two-man Senate fact-finding mission was given a "cool but correct" reception by officials here, where the pro-Government press often refers to Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as a Communist fellow-traveler for criticizing the Greek junta.

Although the two investigators apparently applied in advance for appointments with top leaders, they were seen only by Education Minister Nikitas Sioris, Press Under Secretary George Georgalas, and Foreign Under Secretary Christian Xanthopoulos-Palamas.

Opponents of the junta were reported to have complained that their contacts with the United States Embassy here were sparse. The more inflexible among them accused the United States of forsaking its democratic principles by backing the Greek regime unreservedly in order to protect its strategic position in the area.

The two investigators interviewed Alexandros Dimitas, president of the Council of State, the nation's highest administrative tribunal, which has often challenged the junta's abuse of authority.

They sought information on the number of Greeks—estimated at 40 to 120—arrested since Nov. 28 and held incommunicado in evident defiance of the habeas corpus provisions of the Constitution. The restoration of the provisions by Premier Papadopoulos in April last year weighed in the United States decision to resume full military aid.

On Feb. 20, the Greek Government maintained that no amount of pressure from the United States would influence its political course at home.

## Fulbright, in Senate, Defends Rogers Position on Middle East

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 23 — Senator J. W. Fulbright came to the defense of Secretary of State William P. Rogers today against Senate critics who charged that the Secretary was undermining Israeli interests in a Middle East settlement.

The sight of Mr. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, on the Senate floor to defend rather than criticize Mr. Rogers was unusual in itself. But just as unexpected was the sight of Mr. Fulbright, joined by Senator George D. Aiken of Vermont, the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, engaging in a sometimes testy exchange on the floor with the pro-Israeli bloc in the Senate.

A group of Senators, led by Jacob K. Javits, Republican of New York and Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, had organized a campaign to attack Mr. Rogers's recently stated position that Israel should withdraw from occupied Egyptian territory in return for international security guarantees.

Mr. Javits suggested that Mr. Rogers was indulging in irrelevant 19th-century diplomacy in thinking that Israel's security could be guaranteed by the great powers rather than by defensible geographical boundaries.

### Jackson Goes Further

In his prepared speech, Mr. Jackson went even further, suggesting that Mr. Rogers was "courting disaster" in proffering a plan that would force Israel back to "vulnerable borders" and then include the Soviet Union in an international peace force. Contending that the central issue in the Middle East was a United States-Soviet confrontation, the Senator said, "We should be trying to get the Russians out of the Middle East, not designing plans to dig them in."

Participating in the campaign led by Senator Javits and Senator Jackson were Democratic Senators Abraham A. Ribicoff of Connecticut, Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota, and Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, the Republican leader. All of them had attended a breakfast meeting at the Capitol last Friday with Abba Eban, the Israeli Foreign Minister.

When Senator Aiken heard the anti-Rogers tone of the campaign, he sent an urgent note to Senator Fulbright, who was attending a briefing of the Foreign Relations Committee by the Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, informing him "they are tearing the Secretary apart on the

Middle East, come on up and help."

Mr. Rogers, who has been smarting ever since Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri, suggested that he had become a laughingstock on the Washington cocktail circuit, was also active on its own behalf. When he read in the Congressional Record this morning that the campaign was planned, according to Senate sources, he called Senators Javits and Senator Jackson, seeking to explain his position. Mr. Rogers's legislative assistant, David Abshire, meanwhile, was calling other Senators, seeking to rally support for the State Department's position.

### Fulbright Protests

The exchange flared unexpectedly. As has been their custom in the past, the pro-Israeli Senators were engaging in a series of exchanges defending the Israeli position. Senator Javits was about to begin his three-page speech criticizing Mr. Rogers's approach to a Middle East settlement.

Mr. Javits was no more than three paragraphs into his speech before Mr. Fulbright was on his feet to protest that Mr. Rogers was pursuing a "correct" and "wise" policy and to suggest that the purpose of the campaign was to exert political pressure on the Administration to retreat.

"The principal reason that there has been no progress on a negotiated settlement," Senator Fulbright told Senator Javits, "is the belief on the part of Israel that the United States and the Senate will back it, no matter what position it takes."

"Its attitude is most unfortunate, because I do not see any possibility of a negotiated settlement so long as Israel believes we are completely at its disposal," Mr. Fulbright said.

### Javits's Voice Rises

He went on to warn that Israel should not "take the United States so much for granted."

"At the moment they do have the influence in Congress to support them," he said, "but if they create the impression of being too determined not to negotiate, they run a great risk of losing the support they heretofore had."

As the exchange continued, Senator Javits's voice rose to the point that Senator Fulbright broke in to express the hope that the issue could be discussed without becoming "too emotional."

"I am not getting emotional," Senator Javits said as he protested that Senator Fulbright was presenting "a completely one-sided position."

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THE WASHINGTON POST

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## Pentagon Indicates Laos Incursion Did Not Precisely Meet Its Schedule

A Defense Department spokesman said yesterday that the South Vietnamese incursion into Laos might have lasted longer had the Communist not offered so much resistance. But, he said, the operation might have been even shorter than it was if the resistance had been stiffer.

"Obviously, the enemy's reactions have some influence on the course of a battle," said Jerry W. Friedheim.

This seemed to represent a more flexible administration approach to characterizing the course of the incursion. It contrasted with previous administration insistence that everything was going strictly according to schedule.

Friedheim insisted, however, that the operation was still

within the general schedule guidelines assigned to it. He said the South Vietnamese had told Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird in January that the operation would last five to eight weeks. It has been about six weeks since it started. Some administration sources have said that it was to continue until about May 1, the start of the monsoon season.

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield said yesterday he had understood that the South Vietnamese would remain in Laos until May 1 and that the current withdrawal is "hasty." The Ho Chi Minh Trail will be back into operation soon, before the rains come, he said.

Two other Democratic Sena-

tors, Stuart W. Symington (Mo.) and J. W. Fulbright (Ark.) complained after a briefing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by CIA chief Richard C. Helms that what they are being told now differs from what officials told them in another briefing in early February.

"Based on the earlier briefing," Fulbright said, "I did not expect the operation to be as serious or as costly as it turned out to be." He questioned whether the results achieved were worth the effort.

"If the briefings we were given in the first part of February were right," Symington said, "they're certainly not going according to plan the last few days."

## ROGERS TO BRIEF SENATORS TODAY

Mideast Will Be Discussed  
in an Unusual Meeting

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 24 — Secretary of State Rogers is to meet with the Senate in closed session tomorrow to explain United States policy in the Middle East.

The meeting, described by State Department and Senate historians as the first of its kind since World War II, was proposed by Mr. Rogers to the Senate Majority Leader, Mike Mansfield of Montana, and is to be held under the joint auspices of Senator Mansfield and the Minority Leader, Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania.

Mr. Mansfield's office said today that all the Senators had been advised of the meeting but that it would not be known until the last moment how many would be present.

Yesterday there was angry debate on the Senate floor in which Senator J. W. Fulbright, the Arkansas Democrat who is Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, joined with Senator George D. Aiken, Vermont Republican, defending Mr. Rogers's middle Eastern policies against criticism by Senator Jacob K. Javits, Republican of New York, and Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington.

### Fulbright Defends Rogers

During yesterday's debate, Mr. Fulbright, a frequent critic of the Administration's foreign policies, rose to defend Mr. Rogers from charges that the State Department was courting disaster by seeking to force Israel to withdraw to the borders before the 1967 Middle East war in order to obtain a peace settlement.

State Department officials said, however, that Mr. Rogers's suggestion that he brief the Senate on the Middle East was made before yesterday's debate.

The State Department's press officer, Charles W. Bray 3d, said that Mr. Rogers had volunteered to appear because he was "anxious for the facts of the situation to be available to members of the Senate."

He said that Mr. Rogers hoped to discuss tomorrow not only the controversial question of a peace-keeping force in which the United States might participate but all aspects of the Middle Eastern crisis.

### Interested in Exposure

But the State Department made no effort to dispel the impression that Mr. Rogers wanted to discuss the Middle East with the Senators after the Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, had presented the Israeli position at a breakfast meeting Friday with 40 Senators.

The department also conceded that Mr. Rogers, recently accused in the Senate of falling short in his performance as Secretary of State, was interested in gaining as much political exposure as possible.

Mr. Bray said that "it is clear from the number of occasions on which Mr. Rogers has testified this year that he takes his and the Department of State's relations with Congress very seriously."

On Saturday, the State Department is to issue its annual statement on foreign policy, a month after President Nixon's message to Congress on the State of the World.

Official historians said that the last time they knew of a meeting between a high-ranking State Department official and the Senate membership was a wartime briefing by Dean Acheson, then Under Secretary of State.

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**Rogers:**

## It Was a Slow Burn But a Good One

WASHINGTON—It was galling enough for Secretary of State William P. Rogers to have Senators suggest he had become a laughing stock on the Washington cocktail circuit because Henry Kissinger had displaced him as the President's chief foreign affairs adviser. But it became almost intolerable when the Senate turned to Abba Eban, Foreign Minister of Israel, for an explanation of his policy in the Middle East.

Out of those interrelated irritants an episode in personal diplomacy developed last week that enhanced the stature of Mr. Rogers in the Senate, blunted the outspokenness, if not the influence, of the pro-Israeli faction in Congress and perhaps clarified the Administration's position on a Middle East settlement.

The episode began on Friday morning in the preceding week when Mr. Eban, by prearrangement with a Senate group that included Senators Jacob K. Javits of New York, Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, Robert Dole of Kansas, Henry M. Jackson of Washington, Stuart Symington of Missouri and Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut, showed up on Capitol Hill for a "coffee meeting." Some 40 Senators attended.

Senator J. W. Fulbright of Arkansas, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was to comment later that "it is a curious thing for the Foreign Minister of Israel to come over here and usurp the function of the Secretary of State." The same thought apparently passed through the mind of Mr. Rogers, who Friday afternoon made inconclusive overtures to Senator Javits that he be permitted a similar audience.

Mr. Rogers's indignation boiled over Tuesday morning when he learned that most of the Senators who had arranged the Eban briefing had scheduled an exchange of speeches on the Senate floor to attack his Middle East policy as undermining the Israeli bargaining position. Senator Javits suggested Mr. Rogers was indulging in "nineteenth century diplomacy" in suggesting that geographical boundaries were not as important to Israel's security as international guarantees. Senator Jackson accused the Secretary of "courting disaster" by proposing an interna-

tional peacekeeping force that would have "the effect of legitimizing the Russian military presence" in the Middle East. Through their comments ran the theme — undoubtedly reflecting the Eban briefing — that the State Department was pressuring Israel to withdraw to insecure boundaries before it even got into negotiations with the Arabs.

Mr. Rogers called the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to ask Senator Fulbright and Senator George D. Aiken of Vermont, the ranking Republican, to come to his defense on the Senate floor, which they promptly did. Across the aisle, Senator Fulbright told Senator Javits that there would never be a negotiated settlement if there "is the belief on the part of Israel that the United States and the Senate will back it, no matter what position it takes."

Mr. Rogers also said in his telephone call that "it was passing strange that 40 Senators turn up to hear the Israeli Foreign Minister and only half a dozen Senators come to hear the Secretary of State before the Foreign Relations Committee, and even then Senator Javits comes in late."

The exchange on the Senate floor was no sooner over than David Abshire, Mr. Rogers's Congressional aide, went to the office of Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield to ask: "Do you think the Senators would be interested in a meeting with the Secretary of State to answer any questions they might have on Mideast policy?"

"I think they would be delighted," responded Senator Mansfield, who suggested that Mr. Abshire check with Senator Scott, the Republican leader, so that the invitations could be extended on a bipartisan basis. "Scott is willing," Mr. Abshire reported back, and the next day all the Senators were invited to a briefing by the Secretary — the first such occasion since Secretary of State Dean Rusk briefed the Senate on the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Sixty Senators attended.

### Secretary's Position

In the 90-minute meeting, Mr. Rogers apparently succeeded in mollifying his critics by assuring them that he was not proposing that Israel give up occupied Arab territory before the negotiations began or a peace settlement was reached. Rather, he explained, Israel was simply being urged to accept the principle of withdrawal to get the stalemated negotiations under way.

The Secretary of State apparently succeeded in fuzzing over in the Senators' minds some fundamental differences between the United States and Israel, not the least of which is the Israeli concern that it would give away its bargaining position if it accepted in advance the Rogers principle of total withdrawal from Egyptian territory. In the process, Mr. Rogers, perhaps, lifted some of his pressure on Israel to accept the principle, which probably was Mr. Eban's objective all along.

Whatever the impact on the diplomatic negotiations, Mr. Rogers, who has staked his prestige on the Middle East, increased his personal stature as Secretary of State. As the meeting ended, Senator Mansfield arose to say that "the Senate was honored to have the President's chief foreign policy adviser meet with us on an issue of such overriding importance."

—JOHN W. FINNEY

THE WASHINGTON POST

# Laos Move Called Failure By Fulbright

By Spencer Rich  
Washington Post Staff Writer

**Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.)** said yesterday that the American-backed move into Laos by South Vietnam failed to achieve five key military objectives outlined in secret testimony by top administration officials on Feb. 9.

Fulbright, in a new assault clearly signaling the end of an informal truce over the Laos issue between Senate doves and the administration, said official claims that the Laos operation "went according to plan" represent "either a massive deception of the American people, or . . . a massive misjudgment on the part of our political or military leaders."

The Feb. 9 briefing was conducted by Secretary of State William P. Rogers and a Joint Chiefs of Staff aide, Lt. Gen. John W. Vogt Jr., a day after the Laos operation began. Despite efforts by Fulbright, it has not been declassified.

On the basis on what the committee was told then, Fulbright said in a floor speech on the Laos operation, "I know it did not go according to plan." In at least five respects, he indicated, the objectives set forth then have not been met.

See FULBRIGHT, A16, Col. 1

## FULBRIGHT, From A1

Fulbright said that on the basis of information brought out at the briefing, the American people were entitled to demand that, before claiming success, the administration provide "clear and unequivocal answers" to the following questions about the operation's objectives and whether they had been met:

- "One, was the concept of the operation in Laos to proceed in and beyond Sepone and to establish blocking positions on the main intersections of Routes 91, 11, 92 and 23?"

- "Two, was it hoped that the operation would prevent the flow of supplies south through the remainder of the dry period by maintaining these blocking points while the good weather period lasted, that is, until May 1?"

- "Three, was it believed that the enemy had no capability for providing major reinforcements to threaten seriously the South Vietnamese forces in Laos and that consequently no major threat would develop to the operation?"

- "Four, was it planned that South Vietnamese forces would be in the Sepone area within the first weeks of the

operation and would then fan out and establish blocking positions which would be supplied, reequipped, and maintained for an extended period of time?"

- "Five, was it hoped that the enemy supplies to South Vietnam could be completely cut off so that North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam and Cambodia would die on the vine?"

Calling upon Rogers to declassify the Feb. 9 briefing transcript so that the administration's claims of success in the Laos operation could be measured against the goals set forth in advance, Fulbright said that since the operation started, "criticism of the Lao-tian move has been muted," but now that it is over, "the time has now come . . . to comment upon the latest developments in Indochina."

He said the Foreign Relations Committee had even delayed scheduling hearings on "How to End the War" so as not to be divisive while the Laos operation was on.

The committee decided yesterday, however, to go ahead with those hearings after Easter. They will touch on proposals for a complete end of the war by Dec. 31, and

could be the centerpiece of a major congressional battle over Indochina policy.

Fulbright's blast at administration credibility over Laos, the decision to proceed with the hearings, and a statement by Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) Monday expressing doubt that the administration is still adhering to the basic principles of the Nixon Doctrine—all these signal that the brief Senate truce on the war is ended.

Asked whether Rogers had requested the committee to withhold its criticism while the Laos operation was in progress and whether members had agreed, Fulbright said, "Well, hope was expressed that there would be little criticism . . . there was no formal agreement." But now, he indicated, any such agreement was ended with the end of the Laos operation.



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## FULBRIGHT PLANS HEARINGS ON WAR

Committee Sessions Due on  
'How to End' Conflict—  
Senate Truce Over

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 30—The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, signaling an end to the truce in the Indo-China debate, decided today to push ahead with public hearings on "how to end the war."

In telling the Senate of the committee's decision, Senator J. W. Fulbright, its chairman, charged that the Nixon Administration was guilty of either "massive deception" or "massive misjudgment"—and perhaps both—in the American-supported South Vietnamese invasion of Laos.

Citing the five principal objectives that he contended the Administration had laid down for the operation in a Feb. 9 briefing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Fulbright suggested that none had been achieved and that the operation had been based on miscalculations about the strength and reaction of North Vietnamese forces.

At the suggestion of Republicans, who cited deference to the President, the committee decided not to begin the "end the war" hearings until after Mr. Nixon announced his new troop withdrawal schedule in April. But aside from this accommodation, it was apparent that the Indochina debate was about to resume in the Senate, with perhaps greater vigor than ever being shown in challenging the Nixon Administration's policies.

As Senator Fulbright observed, the Foreign Relations Committee—the center of the Vietnam opposition in the Senate—has been "muted" since the operations in Laos began in early February, partly "be-

cause we did not want to anything that might remotely be construed as a cause for failure of an operation already under way but about which we all had most serious and profound doubts."

The committee, for example, put off a series of hearings it planned on how to end the war. At a private meeting on Feb. 9, the committee also entered into an informal pact with Secretary of State William P. Rogers to restrain its criticism and not create a "domestic fuss" over the operation in Laos.

Mr. Rogers reportedly told the committee that "there will be plenty of time to criticize after the operation is over if it is a failure." According to State Department associates, Mr. Rogers feels that the terms of the truce should be extended until there is a clearer evaluation of the results of the operation in Laos.

But now that the operation has ended, Senator Fulbright made clear that he no longer felt bound to maintain his silence. And other members of the committee, such as Senator John Sherman Cooper, Republican of Kentucky, are preparing to speak out, making the point that, now that the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution has been repealed, the President has no legal or constitutional authority except to withdraw the troops from Vietnam.

### Decision Explained

In explaining his decision to speak out, Senator Fulbright told the Senate:

"Were I to remain silent, I would be a partner to what is either a massive deception of the American people or what is a massive misjudgment on the part of our political or military leaders."

He said in a speech that had been prepared for several days that he could not remain silent "when we are being told that the Laos operation went 'according to plan' when I know it did not go according to plan."

In support of his contention, Senator Fulbright noted that on Feb. 9—just as the invasion of Laos was beginning—the committee had been briefed on the objectives of the operation by Secretary of State Rogers and Lieut. Gen. John W. Vogt Jr., director of the Joint Staff in the Pentagon.

Now that the operation is over, Senator Fulbright said, he had asked Mr. Rogers to declassify the briefing, but he obviously set forth the objectives presented the committee in asking the Administration to answer the following questions in "clear and unequivocal language."

Q "Was the concept of the operation in Laos to proceed in and beyond Tchepone and to establish blocking positions on the main intersections of Routes 91, 11, 92 and 23?"

Q "Was it hoped that the operation would prevent the flow of supplies south through the remainder of the dry period by maintaining these blocking points while the good weather period lasted? That is, until May 1?"

Q "Was it believed that the enemy had no capability for providing major reinforcements to threaten seriously the South Vietnamese forces in Laos and that consequently no major threat would develop to the operation?"

Q "Was it planned that South Vietnamese forces would be in the Tchepone area with the first weeks of the operation and would then fan out and establish blocking positions

which would be supplied, re-equipped and maintained for an extended period of time?"

Q "Was it hoped that the enemy supplies to South Vietnam could be completely cut off so that North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam and Cambodia would die on the vine?"

Most of these objectives have been discussed in the press on the basis of background briefings given by the Pentagon and the military command in Saigon shortly after the start

of the operation. The Administration, however, has avoided committing itself publicly to any specific objective for the operation other than the general goal of disrupting the enemy supply lines.

In a background briefing on Feb. 10, General Vogt told newsmen that South Vietnamese forces might proceed as far westward as Route 23 in order to "disrupt" the enemy supply flow on the highway but not to block it. He also cited Tchepone as a principal target and mentioned the start of the rainy season, about May 1, as a probable date for ending the operation.

Today spokesmen at the State and Defense Departments declined immediate comment on Senator Fulbright's remarks.

On the basis of information given to the committee, Senator Fulbright said, it was clear that the questions he had asked, "can be answered with a simple yes or no."

"There remains only one question to ask, and that is will the Administration answer these questions in a straightforward manner or must the American people be left to believe that the Laos operation went according to plan."

If Administration officials

appear before the committee, at the "end the war" hearings, these questions are certain to be raised. But as conceived by Senator Fulbright and other committee members, the hearings are not so much to criticize the operation in Laos as to put pressure on the Administration to withdraw all forces from Vietnam.

The focal point of the hearings will be the various Vietnam resolutions that have been introduced. These include a bill by Senators George S. McGovern and Mark Hatfield that would require total withdrawal by the end of this year and an amendment by Senators William B. Saxbe and Walter F. Mondale that would preclude American support of a South Vietnamese invasion of North Vietnam.

Even among the critics of the Indochina war there is little hope that any of these resolutions, which in various ways would restrict the authority of the President, will be enacted. But through public hearings on the resolution, committee members such as Senator Fulbright hope to focus public attention, and thus political pressure, on the Administration in favor of complete withdrawal.